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TT7HEN we turn from the part individual responsibility has
• * played in ethical theory and consider it in and of itself, it at
once appears of so simple a nature that its absence from the world-
view of early men becomes in itself a problem. How does it happen
that they had not even a rough conception of individual account-
ability and that they failed to distinguish between designed and ac-
cidental acts ? ^^'estermarck points out that lower animals quite
naturally retaliate on the agent of an ill turn, and he gives copious
illustration.' It must have been the force of some potent concep-
tion that prevented the issue of this simple notion among early men.
'Tt needs little reflection and a very moderate amount of self-
knowledge"", says Hobhouse,^ "to distinguish between design and
accident and a very moderate amount of reasoning power to apply
the same to other men. lUit the nascent reflection of savage men
was strangled at birth by the prevailing theorv of witch-craft and
possession". Well, at least, by some attitude or conception of more
profound force than the sense of individual agency.
This fact will be made to stand out in relief by a glance at the
issue of the notion of individual responsibility in relation to the
concept of moral evil among the Greeks. It had different issues in
philosophy and in drama, so that a comparison is illuminating.
With the former it became in Aristotle the basic principle of ethics
—the sine qua non. It excluded from the field of ethics whatever
was incompatible with itself. In the latter it plays a subordinate
''Origin and Dcvcloptncnt of Moral Ideas, Vol. I, p. 36 f.
^Morals in Evolution, Vol. I, p. 93.
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and baffling part. There is a force, deeper and of wider scope,
called from of old /a/^, incompatible with individual responsibility,
which nevertheless cannot be excluded from one field with it.
Surely it was no great achievement for such a mind as Aristotle
to bring to complete clearness the notion of individual responsibility.
What lies in it, abstractly considered, is not hard to get at. But in
making this analysis, Aristotle was resisting a powerful force in
Greek tradition. Plato had gone part way. Positing individual re-
sponsibility as the ground necessitating ethics, he had attributed the
power of choice to the individual. But he continued to hold with
Socrates that a luan who did evil was not free. He was held in
bonds. Here is the inward coercion which Aristotle found limiting
the will. He excluded it from ethics because it came from beyond
the individual's volition : what the individual agent could not
avoid did not belong to the field of ethics.^ But Plato will not so
easily exclude it. Instead he attempts to rationalize it.^'' That
"blindness of passion", which the Greeks among all other peoples
attributed to the gods, was not easily to be excluded from the realm
of ethics. It had one undivided basis in reality with human volition.
The weight of this realm of psychical coercion, of '^non-volitional
conation", which is the life -centre of religion in primitive times and
in all times, held strongly against a clear realization of individual
responsibility among all early men. It is powerfully evident in all
Greek ethical thinking.
The ethical thought of both the philosophers and dramatists of
Greece is passionate and strained. In all the history of human think-
ing there is perhaps no equal instance of baffled eagerness. In the
gnomic thinkers the Greek intelligence was tearing itself away from
religious tradition. A sensitive moral consciousness attempted to
rqDudiate gods that were evil as well as good and to find a clear
basis for reality. But they could achieve no immediate insight
upon which they could proceed without emotion. The simple notion
of individual responsibility did not issue to clarify their thinking.
Profound feeling is reflected in the fragments of early philosophy
like the passion Euripides manifests in his treatment of deity. It
is due to the baffled sense that both evil and good have their basis
of reality beyond the volition and also the insight of the individual.
^K'ichoinachean Ethics, Book III, Chap. V, 2, 4.
loWindelband, History of Philosophy, tr. Jas. H. Tufts, p. 191 f.
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In the primitive world-view which was their starting-point they
found individuals and peoples submerged in a cosmic evil, an "un-
cleanness' of shed blood and of passionate strife which issued from
the unseen world of gods and fates. The individual was merged
escapelessly in fated courses. Guilt might fall upon a man by acci-
dent and infect a city. It might centre upon a stick or a falling
stone, and these must be solemnly tried and if found guilty, carried
beyond the borders. Philosophers and dramatists as well as com-
mon men found a reality in these traditional attitudes not easily to
be shaken off. Why is it that this does not appear to the foremost
minds of classical Greece to be a silly superstition of savages? It
fixed itself upon courts of law down even to modern times. The
fact gives evidence that this early attitude of thought has some
ground in reality. Pericles and Protagoras debated through a
whole day as to whether, in a certain accident, a man or a spear was
the bearer of the guilt of bloodshed.^^ Plato's Lazvs provide for the
trial of animals and inanimate things and for their death or banish-
ment if found guilty.^- It become difficult to believe that the main
conceptions of early men arose from no real basis in human nature
but were superstitions, entirely adventitious, which prevented the
arrival of human intelligence at the simple notion of individual re-
sponsibility.
Early Greek science remained farther afield in the traditional
world-view than did the dramatists, who indeed were of a later day.
The early scientists interpreted polarity in nature—the "strife of
opposites"—as cases of evil—of the "uncleanness" of tradition.
They treated it, without figure, as a vendetta in nature, quite as
the Dionysian ritual treated the opposition between the gods of
the old and of the new year. A fragment from Anaxamander says,
"All things suffer retribution for their injustice to each other ac-
cording to the ordinance of time". Heraclitus views this strife of
opposites as the basis of the natural world. Quite in the spirit of
earliest human thought, moral evil is made a force of universal
scope, a cosmic principle. Only, reduced thus to a universal scien-
tific law, its moral aspect becomes thin, and disappears. The pre-
dominant notion of tradition, namely, the superindividual, super-
particular aspect of evil, was dominant also in the minds of these
i^Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, p. 446.
12873 f. See Westermarck, Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. X, for a full account
of the force of this idea down to modern times.
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thinkers. But in reducing' a moral attitude to a scientific principle,
they moved off the basis of tradition into the "Enlio;htcnment".
Socrates took another course. He clearly separated the natural
and ethical realms. But, true to the spirit of the "Enlightenment",
he conceived the good as a noetic form which the individual could
grasp and so achieve. He thus paved the way by which Aristotle
escaped from Greek tradition and reduced ethics to the realm of
individual volition. The social atomism in Aristotle's definition of
moral good and evil as precisely what the individual has power to
do or to avoid was a logical issue of the Greek Enlightenment.
But the dramatists present a separate development of ethical
ideas in which they do not move off the basis of tradition into the
abstract. They are concerned with the problem of "fate"—the
problem, that is, of the imposition of evil upon the individual. They
stand squarely with primitive traditions in general in attaching a
moral opprobrium—an intense sense of guilt—to the individual,
even under his superimposed evil. However the aspects of evil
which occupy the centre of the stage in Greek drama are always
such acts as common sense in our own day would call moral evil.
To be sure all traditions, such as the uncleanness of non-moral
breaches of taboo, are reflected in the plays but they never claim
the centre of interest. Sophocles, it is true, presents Oedipus, who
has fallen by an accident into patricide and incest, as Tra? avayvo?,
wholly polluted and full of guilt. But Sophocles stands nearest to
tradition. He is interested in painting nobility of character in the
face of traditional "sin". Aeschylus and Euripides however have
entirely humanized the content of tradition and correctly delimited
the field of ethics. The Center of their stage is always occupied by
moral evils in which individuals are involved, not accidentally but
by their own volition. But the evils are fated evils, larger than
themselves. In the Agamemnon of Aeschvlus. the "fury of the
house of Atridae" involves Clytemnestra in the slaying of Agamem-
non. In the sequel it involves Orestes in the mother murder.
The volition of each is escapelessly drawn into a concatenation of
evils forming a compact social unity in which every link is a neces-
sity though at the same time it involves the volition of an individual.
Euripides presents similar situations, only with broad political mean-
ings suggested. The present writer has pointed out in another
place^^ that the view of moral evil here presented is the same view
^'lutcrnational Journal of Ethics, Vol. 55, No. 1, Oct. 1924.
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which, with or without attempted explanation, has been held by
Hebrew and Christian tradition, by many great minds in widely dif-
ferent religious and secular circles,—Hebrew prophets, Greek dra-
matists, modern satirists, poets, and novelists, by one philosopher,
Immanuel Kant, and by occidental common sense entire. This view
differs from primitive man's conception only in that natural evil
and accident are excluded. The essential characteristic of the prim-
itive attitude is maintained—the superindividual qualitv of moral
evil. The concept, as social atomism will view it at least, con-
tinues to carry a contradiction at its heart. It is larger than any
individual and involves all individuals somewhere and sometime in
its stream. It is escapeless, yet every man is responsible for his
deeds. Just as the inwardness of moral good—the Word of the
Lord in the hearts of all the people—is conceived by Jeremiah as
the spirit of a new and lasting Israel, a religious and social force
focussed inwardly in each individual, so also the motive of evil,
taken up and willed by the individual is yet involved in a social set-
ting of evil which renders it inevitable. In this view of moral evil
which has persisted through all ages of history, what is essential to
the view of primitive man is unchangeably maintained. The in-
dividual is still the locus of moral evil focussing from beyond him.
Only now the line separating the moral from the physical universe
is clearly drawn and the locus of moral evil is identified with the
moral agent. The notion of individual responsibility has emerged
at the heart of a larger conception which long blocked its egress
and with which it appears to be wholly incompatible. But it is
maintained even in contradiction by a vigorous though baffled re-
action to things as they are.
What prevented this simple notion from issuing in the thought
of early men, though it is plainly evident in the behavior of lower
animals, may be clearly outlined. It is clear tbat there can be no
responsibility at all unless it gets its locus in the individual. But
philosophers have never been able to draw a distinct line except in
the abstract between the accountability of the individual and the
force arising out of the social miliou and impelling the individual.
Left in the abstract, Aristotle's analysis is clear and clearly defines
individual responsibility. The responsibility of the agent is limited
by ignorance of the matter, by physical compulsion and by psychical
coersion." But when he comes to cases, Aristotle is well aware that
"O/). at., Book III, Chap. I, esp. 10 and 11.
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no distinct line marks off the agent's responsibility. No distinct
line can be drawn between what was due to his own volition and
what was due to psychical coercion out; of his social milieu. It
becomes evident that these two form an intrinsic unity not to be di-
vided except by violence. The immediate agent must then be con-
ceived as the locus of a responsibility that is wider than his own
volition. It finds other secondary loci in less immediate agents.
Their combined responsibility is manifest as merged into an es-
sential unity. It extends to the limits of the immediate agent's so-
cial milieu. It unites in an intrinsic whole incalculably many indi-
vidual responsibilities. What can be imputed to the immediate
agent can only be roughly assessed for purposes of judicial usage of
him.
Since this is so it becomes clear that individual responsibility,
taken as such and by itself, is not the test of ethical situations. What
is fundamental to ethics is a conception of responsibility which is
other than but inclusive of individual responsibility. This fact
taken at its full value would have wide bearing upon ethical theory.
Among other things it would vitiate the usual method of investigat-
ing moral origins and development. Might it not be that the full
quality and passion of an ethical situation might attach to the sense
of group responsibility, while yet the part of the immediate agent
among the other parts of this intrinsic whole was felt only in the
vaguest way?
It may be stated with some degree of confidence then, that the
process of moral advance has not been one of adding moral elements
to a primitively non-moral world-view. It has been that, rather, of
eliminating non-moral elements through an analysis brought by
experience to the content of religion. This fact may be best illus-
trated by a brief outline of this process of moral advance as it ac-
tually occurred in Hebrew history. Here, by a remarkable social
experience, incompatible and adventitious elements were eliminated
and an adequate conception of the suniuuun honnm was achieved.
The iniah clohini is the primitive theoplasm, the source of all
power, both of good and of evil.^'' W\t\\ certain tribes it w^as cen-
tred in Jahweh. Moses who is the founder of Jahwism, experienced
a profound social passion for his people enslaved in Egypt. He
attributed this social passion to Jahweh. He conceived himself as
i^Kautsch. Hasting's Bible Dictionary, Vol. V, p. 667a. Gershenson, The
Key to Faith, tr. Herman Frank, p. 124 f.
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the vicegerent of God not as a conqueror but as the Hberator of a slave
people. He considered social justice to be the outstanding character-
istic of his god, Jahweh. The ruah Jahzveh became the source, no
longer of both good and evil, but of good alone. There gradually
developed in the prophetic succession a clear insight into the in-
compatibility of magic practices with the social justice that character-
ized Jahweh. When the nation relied upon ritual rather than upon
righteousness, ritual also was denounced by the prophets. The end
in view was a society based in righteousness—the people of Jahweh.
Jeremiah finally saw that the national responsibility could not be
mediated through kings and priests. That method was proved a
failure by the events leading up to the exile. He conceived of the
social responsibility and the authority of Jahweh as being localized
in the inward nature of the individual people themselves. The law
of God was written in the hearts of the people. Moreover the con-
ception of the supreme good, thus made inward, is also made hu-
manity-wide. In the Deutero-Isaiah, all the nations of the world are
to be brought into a harmonious society. The ruah clohhn, the
primitive theoplasm, has been cleansed of adventitious elements and
has become at once inward and universal through the discovery by
Moses of its profoundly social nature.
That this social nature was, from the earliest times, powerfully
if vaguely felt to lie in the primitive theoplasm or mana is strongly
suggested in several primitive notions. The human being as such,
and especially the human being in need, has a special power over
the religious dread of early races. Though warriors rightly
slaughtered their tribal foes ; though any "outlandish" person was
often, as such, a fit object for hate and slaughter; yet the shed
blood, even of an enemy, was an uncleanness that required in some
cases months of cleansing ritual. Again, the greatest sin of early
times was the neglect of the guest. The stranger, as though merely
by virtue of his humanity, had a powerful claim upon primitive men.
That this claim had its sanction in superstition, and that when it was
fulfilled, the host might follow and rob his former guest, does not
lessen but rather deepens the significance of the fact ; since thus
forces are presented which would have submerged hospitality, if it
had had its basis in mere accident and not in human nature itself.
Besides these facts there is the superior potency of the curses of
the poor and needy. The fundamentally social nature of the original
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theoplasm of primitive conception is thus strongly suggested ; and,
in the conception of the Kingdom of God issuing from Hehrew tra-
dition, it may be said that the primitive world-view had only at-
tained clearness and eliminated extraneous matters in the course of
its development from pre-J\Iosiac religion to the religion of Jesus.
We affirm then with some confidence that the group conscious-
ness of early man was a genuine moral consciousness and his sense
of group responsibility had genuine moral force. The truly en-
lightened moral consciousness will not find the concept of individual
responsibility to be the nub of ethics. The ground of ethics lies
rather in a passion that reprobates moral evil and delights in moral
good without any immediate reference to individuals. It affirms,
for instance, that the Great War ought not to have been and there-
fore somehow might have been avoided by mankind, without plac-
ing passionate measures of responsibility on individuals and special
groups. As we have said, roughly to assess individual responsibility
in things past, has its judicial use. But responsibility finds its com-
plete meaning only in its forward looking aspect, where some large
social purpose renders each individual a locus of a common respon-
sibility, each locus dififering from others according to the differing
powers and opportunities of individuals. Individual responsibility
is an organic element in social responsibility.
We can merely suggest in conclusion what can be developed
only in another place—that this view of the imposition of good and
evil upon the individual and, at the same time, his personal in-
volvement in the one and responsibility for the other can be ex-
plained only by taking at its face value the saying of Aristotle that
man is a political, i. e., a social animal, by following it to its logical
conclusion and making it the working hypothesis of both psychology
and ethics. The hypothesis that sociality is in its essence an acquired
matter will not fit the case, if the common sense view of moral evil,
supported by the weight of great but non-metaphysical minds is not
to be explained away; and especially if it bear the relation we have
suggested to the primitive tradition. We are compelled to conceive
of man, not, indeed, as "having a social instinct", but rather, we
suggest, as having all the original impulses of his nature centered
about a gregarious drive in an innate system whose connections
may be weaker or stronger in dififerent individuals and weakened
or strengthened by education in different social circles. Those
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who find real force in the present tendency to view all innate drives,
at least all human innate drives, as general without anything speci-
fic in their object-quest, may be reminded that a gregarious drive
will have the general nature of the species in question. Only, any
member of this species to which the organism itself belongs serves
to awaken the gregarious drive into operation, or any species cry,
or other sign, whose mechanism will be innately connected with the
neural basis of the drive.
That the instincts are, from the dawn of human existence, an
innate system, calling for an integrated humanity for its final satis-
faction, suggests that reason may be conceived, not as an "instru-
ment of the instincts", but as itself knit into this open system of
drives as its object-finding or perceptual end, perceiving not only
objects but also objective relations, which are taken up as they are
perceived to parallel relations subjectively realized in the innate
system of impulses and emotions.
